FBI Joins Analysis of Juniper Router at Center of FAA Air Traffic Outage
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The FBI is helping analyse the Juniper router behind the FAA's 13 November air traffic control failure, though no evidence of hacking has surfaced yet.

The question has shifted from what broke to why. The US Department of Transportation (DOT) has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to help analyse the router at the centre of last week's air traffic control (ATC) failure, and that request says something about how seriously the agency is treating the unknowns. Nobody has shown that the system was hacked. But the FAA still can't explain why functions it believed were switched off became active.
Why the FBI is involved
DOT secretary Sean Duffy, speaking on 17 November, said he has no evidence of hacking and that his intelligence contacts have told him the FAA was not hacked. He still wants outside expertise in the room. In his words, he asked FBI director Kash Patel to send part of the bureau's team to help analyse the device. That's a precaution rather than a finding, and it's worth keeping those two things apart when reading coverage of this story.
Here's the thing: when a piece of network hardware behaves in a way its operator didn't configure, investigators have to rule out every explanation, including deliberate interference, before they can say with confidence that it was a configuration problem. Bringing in the FBI speeds that process up without implying a conclusion.
A feature that should have been off
FAA administrator Bryan Bedford said the agency believed it had disabled the relevant functions on the router, which was made by Juniper. Those functions activated anyway, and the reasons remain unknown. Bedford confirmed that Juniper routers can be enabled to do what this one did, which is a different thing from saying they were doing it by design or by default.
"We thought we had that technology turned off. We thought we had it disabled in the configuration," Bedford said. "There is some uncertainty today [about] how the configuration changed in a way that allowed this multi-casting to become effective." He added that the agency has seen nothing showing that the installation itself changed the configuration on that device.
That last point matters. If the installation didn't touch the settings, the open question becomes how a previously disabled capability got switched back on, and whether that happened during the work or afterwards. Those are the questions the analysis now has to answer.
How one router reached 17 sites
The failure came during a project by FAA contractor L3Harris to replace copper wiring with fibre-optic cabling and install a new router. According to Duffy, the device began flooding other routers with what he described as "1,000 connection attempts every four or five seconds". That traffic overwhelmed the legacy systems it was connected to.
The FAA mostly runs Cisco routers and had only recently started using Juniper models. Bedford said the agency spent a year testing the new equipment before deployment, which makes the behaviour harder to explain on the surface. A year of testing doesn't rule out a state that only appears under specific network conditions or after a configuration change, but it does narrow the search.
The effects spread quickly. The problem knocked out ATC radar and air-to-ground communications at 17 of the 22 FAA Air Route Traffic Control sites. Controllers had to keep switching between primary and backup systems. Within an hour, Bedford said, problems "began to trickle into the terminal environment, which is a completely different system". Terminal controllers handle flights close to airports, so the impact reached departures and arrivals, not just en-route airspace.
The FAA has since removed all 68 of the Juniper routers it had installed from use. For operators running similar equipment, that's the practical step that matters most right now: pulling the hardware out of service until the configuration question is settled.
What passengers and airlines felt
The FAA issued a ground stop that lasted about four hours. Airlines had to cancel thousands of flights, and the disruption spread across the national network, which is what turned a technical fault into a broad travel meltdown. Ground stops are a blunt instrument. They protect the system when controllers can't see or talk to aircraft reliably, but they also strand passengers and crews far from where their schedules expect them.
For travellers, the lesson is less about the router and more about how quickly one failed component can cascade through a shared system. Carriers typically respond to events like this by rebooking aggressively and adjusting schedules for several days afterwards, so passengers flying through US hubs in the days after the outage should expect some lingering knock-on effects even though the ground stop itself has ended.
What to watch next
The router is now being studied at an L3Harris site in Florida, and that's where the answers will come from. The key questions are concrete: what configuration state the device was in before the work, what changed, when it changed, and whether the multicast behaviour can be reproduced under controlled conditions. Until those are answered, neither the hacking question nor the configuration question can be closed.
My read is that the FAA's decision to pull all Juniper units was the right call, and the FBI's involvement is best understood as a way to make the analysis watertight rather than a sign that anything criminal has been found. The next meaningful update will be whether the investigators can explain how the disabled functions came back on. That's the answer that will determine whether the agency's Juniper deployment can continue, and on what terms.