767 Freighter’s Hard Nose-Gear Landing Followed Conflicting Control Inputs

A brief loss of shared control awareness preceded a damaging nose-gear touchdown by an Air Transport International Boeing 767-300 freighter at San Bernardino. The aircraft’s upper fuselage buckled and fractured after a sharp derotation on landing; neither pilot was injured.

The freighter, a 1992-built aircraft registered N443AZ and painted in Amazon livery, was arriving from Spokane on 15 January. The first officer was flying an ILS approach to runway 6. The US National Transportation Safety Board’s account describes a disagreement over the aircraft’s pitch as it touched down, followed by abrupt movement of the control column.

Conflicting accounts of the yoke movement

At touchdown, the 767 tended to pitch up. The first officer relaxed the yoke and applied forward pressure. The captain, concerned that the aircraft was rotating too far and could strike its tail, placed a hand against the control column to prevent further aft movement.

The first officer said the yoke moved “abruptly and forcefully” forward, and that he briefly lost his grip. The captain recalled putting his hand up to stop the column moving farther aft. The inquiry could not determine exactly how the two accounts fit together. It said the first officer did not know the captain was restricting aft movement, while the captain, looking towards the runway, did not see that the first officer’s hands had slipped away.

The pilots worked out after landing that there had been a period when apparently neither was holding the controls. Recorded data did not establish when that happened or how long it lasted. The cockpit-voice recording also contained no verbal exchange at the time the captain intervened or the first officer lost his grip.

Recorded pitch and column movements

Flight-data recorder analysis placed the touchdown speed at 124kt, with the aircraft pitched 5° nose-up. The control column was initially about 12° aft, then moved to 6° as the nose lowered. It subsequently travelled to 20° aft before reversing immediately to 20° forward within 1.5 seconds, according to the inquiry.

During that sequence, the aircraft’s pitch increased from 3° to 6° nose-up, then abruptly fell to zero. The nose gear struck the runway with a recorded impact of 1.6g. The data describe a fast change in pitch, but they do not settle precisely when either pilot had a hand on the yoke. The inquiry also could not definitively resolve the difference between the pilots’ recollections of the captain’s intervention and the first officer’s loss of grip.

Fuselage damage and crew coordination

Inspectors found substantial damage along the crown of the upper fuselage. The structure was buckled and fractured, with damage extending to underlying stringers and lap and butt joints. The crew were unhurt, but the findings show that a landing can impose significant structural loads when the nose descends sharply onto the runway.

The inquiry identified inadequate communication about pitch inputs and a lack of awareness of who was controlling the yoke as contributing factors. The sequence involved two pilots reacting to the aircraft’s changing attitude without a recorded verbal exchange to coordinate their inputs. The captain was focused on the runway and tail-strike concern; the first officer did not know the captain was blocking aft movement. With the first officer’s grip lost, neither pilot apparently had the controls for a time.

That distinction matters in a two-pilot cockpit: an intervention intended to limit one movement can change what the other pilot feels at the controls. When both pilots’ understanding of the yoke’s movement differs, prompt communication is needed to establish who is making the input and who has control. In this case, the recorded data reveal the column’s rapid travel, while the crew accounts and cockpit recording leave the precise hand movements unresolved.

The available findings point to the interaction between the pilots and the resulting pitch change; they do not establish a separate mechanical fault. The aircraft’s damaged fuselage, the 1.6g nose-gear impact and the unresolved details of the yoke movement define the event. The central operational lesson in the inquiry is clear: flight crews need to communicate when one pilot intervenes in the other’s control input, especially during the landing flare.

The post Pilot lost grip on control yoke before 767 freighter’s hard nose-gear impact first appeared on FlightGlobal.